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SMM rootkit: a new breed of OS independent
malware
Shawn Embleton, Sherri Sparks and Cliff C. Zou∗
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Central Florida, USA

ABSTRACT
The emergence of hardware virtualization technology has led to the development of OS independent malware such as the
virtual machine-based rootkits (VMBRs). In this paper, we draw attention to a different but related threat that exists on
many commodity systems in operation today: The system management Mode based rootkit (SMBR). System Management
mode (SMM) is a relatively obscure mode on Intel processors used for low-level hardware control. It has its own private
memory space and execution environment which is generally invisible to code running outside (e.g., the Operating System).
Furthermore, SMM code is completely non-preemptible, lacks any concept of privilege level, and is immune to memory
protection mechanisms. These features make it a potentially attractive home for stealthy rootkits used for high-proﬁle targeted
attacks. In this paper, we present our development of a proof of concept SMM rootkit. In it, we explore the potential of
system management mode for malicious use by implementing a chipset level keylogger and a network backdoor capable
of directly interacting with the network card to send logged keystrokes to a remote machine via UDP and receive remote
command packets stealthily. By modifying and reﬂashing the BIOS, the SMM rootkit can install itself on a computer even
if the computer has originally locked its SMM. The rootkit hides its memory footprint and requires no changes to the
existing operating system. It is compared and contrasted with VMBRs. Finally, techniques to defend against these threats
are explored. By taking an offensive perspective we hope to help security researchers better understand the depth and scope
of the problems posed by an emerging class of OS independent malware. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A rootkit consists of a set of programs that work to subvert
control of an operating system from its legitimate users
[1]. If one were asked to classify viruses and worms by
a single deﬁning characteristic, the ﬁrst word to come
to mind would probably be replication. In contrast, the
single deﬁning characteristic of a rootkit is stealth. Viruses
reproduce, but rootkits hide. They hide by compromising
the communication conduit between an operating system
and its users. Secondary to hiding themselves, rootkits
are generally capable of gathering and manipulating
information on the target machine. They may, for example,
log a victim user’s keystrokes to obtain passwords or
manipulate the system state to allow a remote attacker to
gain control by altering security descriptors and access
tokens.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Since the user’s view of the computer system and
its resources is strictly mediated by the information the
operating system provides to it via hardware and software
interfaces, a malicious program that controls the interfaces
controls the entire system. A rootkit hides its presence by
intercepting and altering the interface communications of
various operating ystem or hardware components to hide
ﬁles, processes, and network connections on the computers
that it is installed upon. This hiding may be achieved
either directly or indirectly using code modiﬁcations, data
modiﬁcations, or a combination of both.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the primary
nature of the rootkit is not to infect or compromise a
machine, but rather to hide an attacker’s presence on an
already compromised system. The initial security breach
that allows installation of the rootkit may arise from social
engineering attacks that trick an unsuspecting user into
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running a malicious application or from the exploitation of
unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system and other
critical software.
Early rootkits relied upon system ﬁle masquerade to hide
their presence. An attacker would replace a system ﬁle
with a subversive ﬁle that “masqueraded” as the original
[1]. The login program was a common target for this type
of attack as it could be replaced by a malicious version
which captured the passwords of users as they attempted to
log into a system. This motivated the development of ﬁle
system integrity checkers like Tripwire [1]. Rootkit authors
quickly developed execution path redirection, also known
as hooking, techniques to counter detection by integrity
checkers. Hooking encompasses a class of techniques
whereby a program’s normal control ﬂow is altered to
execute a block of malicious code. It is important to
note that execution path redirection is impervious to
traditional integrity checkers like Tripwire which typically
only check ﬁles stored on the hard disk for modiﬁcations.
This is because they make their changes to the loaded
images in memory rather than to the disk images. Though
more difﬁcult to detect than system ﬁle masquerade,
hooking remains detectable by memory-based integrity
checkers and other heuristic techniques. Eventually, rootkit
authors ﬁgured out how to evade hook detection by using
direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) to modify
dynamic kernel data structures for which it is impossible
to establish reliable heuristics or trusted baseline values
[2]. The idea is that by controlling the data used in a
function, a rootkit can indirectly control the execution
path.
It is clear that rootkit development has exhibited
an adaptive, co-evolutionary pattern in response to
security software advancements. The result has been
an ongoing, sophisticated game of ‘hide and seek’
between rootkit developers and detectors. As rootkits
seek ever better methods to hide their presence on
infected systems, defenders must develop newer, more
advanced techniques to ﬁnd them. With the emergence
of hardware virtualization technology, the rootkit battle
ﬁeld has changed dramatically. Previous rootkits coexisted with the operating system (OS). They exerted their
inﬂuence by redirecting control ﬂow within the OS to
their own malicious code [3]. This was accomplished by
making modiﬁcations to either static or dynamic OS data
structures in memory. Security researchers responded by
developing integrity checkers and heuristics to detect these
changes [4].
Unfortunately, these techniques are useless against
virtual machine based rootkits (VMBRs) which have the
ability to exist independently of any OS. Such rootkits
are able to exert an alarming degree of control without
modifying a single byte in the operating system [5]. A
VMBR hoists the operating system into a virtual machine
and exerts its controls over the machine from an external
virtual machine monitor (VMM). This process is invisible
to the guest OS. Once installed, the VMM is capable of
transparently intercepting and modifying states and events
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occurring in the virtualized OS. It can observe and modify
keystrokes, network packets, memory, and disk I/O. If the
VMBR has virtualized memory, its code footprint will also
be invisible. These things make a VMBR extremely difﬁcult
to detect.
In this paper, we draw attention to another, similar
threat that exists on many commodity systems in operation
today: the system management mode (SMM) based rootkit
(SMBR). SMM is an abbreviation for intel’s system
management mode, a processor mode which has existed
since the i386, yet still remains largely obscure. Unlike
the other processor modes, (e.g., protected, real, virtual
8086) which are designed for running operating systems
or user applications, SMM was developed exclusively for
managing low-level hardware operations like power and
thermal regulation. SMM has its own private memory
space and execution environment which is invisible to code
running outside. Furthermore, SMM code is completely
non-preemptible, lacks any concept of privilege level, and
is immune to memory protection mechanisms [6]. These
features make it an attractive home for malicious rootkits.
In this paper, we present our development of a proof of
concept of an SMBR. In it, we explore the potential of
System Management Mode for malicious use. By taking an
offensive perspective we hope to help security researchers
better understand the depth and scope of the problems posed
by an emerging class of OS independent malware.
Our SMM rootkit provides a high degree of stealth
and control. We demonstrate the construction of a
chipset level keylogger by redirecting the keyboard
interrupt request (IRQ) to system management mode in
the advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC).
Logged keystrokes are then encapsulated into UDP packets
and sent out via the chipset LAN interface. This is all
accomplished without making any visible changes to the
target system. By modifying and reﬂashing the BIOS, the
SMM rootkit can install itself on a computer even if the
computer has originally locked its SMM. We also show
that, once installed, the rootkit remains hidden in memory
making it difﬁcult to detect or remove.
Because of the many similarities, we also compare and
contrast VMBRs with SMBRs on several key characteristics
including operating environment, size, complexity, stealth,
and control. Finally, we discuss countermeasures to detect
and defend against these threats.
It should be noted that SMM rootkit is mainly useful for
advanced targeted attack. First, there is no operating system
driver support for the SMBR to rely upon. Hardware access
therefore requires implementation of rudimentary low-level
drivers inside the SMM handler. Second, the handler must
be written in 16 bit assembly [7]. It is at least mildly
reassuring that writing chipset level hardware device drivers
in 16 bit assembly is beyond the reach of all but the most
sophisticated attackers. As a result, it is unlikely that SMM
will appear in common malware, but will instead remain
limited to sophisticated, targeted attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we discuss some related work. In Section 3, we give
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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an overview of system management mode. We cover the
design and implementation of our proof of concept SMBR
in Section 4. We evaluate it in Section 5 and provide
a comparison and contrast with virtual-machine based
rootkits in Section 6. Defense is discussed in Section 7.
Finally, we conclude in Section 8.

2. RELATED WORK
Our research on SMM rootkits (SMBRs) is related to three
areas of existing rootkit technology: memory management
subversion, virtualization, and BIOS exploitation.
Once a rootkit is publicly known, anti-virus software can
develop a signature for it. Furthermore, rootkit changes
to the OS are detectable using heuristic memory scans.
It is, therefore, advantageous for a rootkit to be able to
hide its memory footprint. Memory subversion was ﬁrst
implemented in the shadow walker rootkit [8]. The Shadow
Walker rootkit demonstrated that it was possible to control
the view of memory regions seen by the operating system
and other processes by hooking the paging mechanism
and exploiting the intel split TLB architecture. Using
these techniques, it was capable of hiding both its own
code and changes to other operating system components.
This enabled it to fool both signature and heuristic-based
scans. Memory virtualization support on intel and AMD
platforms with hardware virtualization extensions can also
be exploited to hide the memory footprint of malicious
code. The general idea behind memory virtualization is
that the virtual machine monitor (VMM) maintains its
own set of page tables in addition to the virtualized guest
OS’s paging structures. The guest OS is free to manage
its own page tables, however, physical translation occurs
using the VMM’s page tables rather than the guest OS’s.
Furthermore, the VMM page tables are inaccessible to the
guest. As a result, the VMM has complete control over
all of the physical memory the guest is allowed to access.
Instructions which affect paging structures and the cache
are also virtualized to cause traps to the VMM. The Blue
Pill II rootkit demonstrated this capability [9]. A SMM
rootkit also has the ability to hide its code footprint, but
it does not require the implementation of complex memory
virtualization code.
Virtual-machine based rootkits have many characteristics
in common with the system management mode-based
rootkit presented in this paper. They both operate at
a layer below the operating system and they both are
capable of intercepting and emulating low-level system
events without needing to modify any existing OS code
or data structures. The VMBR threat was analyzed by
Reference [5]. Using Vmware and Virtual PC, authors
in [5] implemented several malicious VMBR services to
subvert both Windows and Linux. Their implementation,
however, was primarily theoretical. This is due to the fact
that real world operating systems run on native hardware,
not in software virtual machines like Vmware. As real world
attackers are unlikely to implement their malicious code in
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
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Vmware, the malicious services implemented by Reference
[5] are primarily simulations of real world scenarios. Joanna
Rutkowska took the VMBR into the practical domain with
her development of the Blue Pill rootkit [9,10]. The Blue Pill
rootkit exploits AMD hardware virtualization extensions
to migrate a running windows operating system into a
virtual machine. It hides its code footprint using memory
virtualization, supports nested virtual machine monitors,
and implements countermeasures against timing-based
detections. Reference [11] implemented a similar proof of
concept rootkit for MacOS X on the Intel virtualization
platform. This rootkit was code named Vitriol. On the other
hand, there has been very little research on SMM-based
rootkits.
Finally, BIOS rootkits are related to SMM rootkits. The
BIOS is the ﬁrst code that runs when a system is powered on.
It performs diagnostics and initializes the chipset, memory,
and peripheral devices. A rootkit that infects the BIOS is
capable of controlling hardware at a level similar to an
SMBR with the additional beneﬁt of being able to survive
reboots and reinstallations of a new OS. John Heasman
developed a proof of concept BIOS rootkit that acts as a
simple Windows NT backdoor [12]. He used the Advanced
Conﬁguration and Power Interface (ACPI) to patch a
kernel API in system memory. Because his rootkit changed
code in the OS it was detectable using existing rootkit
detection tools like VICE, Blacklight, or Rootkit Revealer
[4,13,14]. For more advanced BIOS rootkits, suggested
countermeasures include disabling ACPI in the BIOS and
auditing the ACPI tables. Further hardware mitigations
include preventing BIOS reﬂashing or requiring that the
BIOS is signed [12]. These countermeasures, however,
cannot defend against an SMM-based rootkit.
Using SMM to escalate privilege was ﬁrst discussed by
Loic Duﬂot [15]. On OpenBSD, the superuser is granted
limited privileges. Duﬂot demonstrated an exploit against
OpenBSD that allowed an attacker to arbitrarily extend
superuser privileges. Because SMM code has unrestricted
access to physical memory, Duﬂot demonstrated that
if attacker can run code in system management mode
and locate the internal variable in memory that the OS
uses to determine the current privilege level, then he
she can modify it to circumvent the operating system’s
built in security and obtain full privileges. To perform
this exploit, the attacker must have the ability to read
and write the programmed I/O registers and the legacy
video memory range. Duﬂot’s exploit, however, was not
a rootkit. His stated goal was privilege escalation, not
stealth. The ability to read and write physical memory is
only one system management mode capability of interest
to a rootkit author. A potentially more advanced and
interesting capability lies in the ability of SMM code to
exert unrestricted control over peripheral hardware. The
fact SMM code is non-pre-emptible and communicates
directly with the hardware makes it stealthy and relatively
immune to detection. In this paper, we build upon
Duﬂot’s work to explore some of the advanced capabilities
of system management mode. The ability to control
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peripheral hardware could make SMM-based malware,
like rootkits, a formidable security threat. Our successful
construction of a SMM chipset level, rootkit keylogger,
and network backdoor shows that SMM is a practical
threat that could be exploited by real world malware
authors.
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3. OVERVIEW OF SMM
This section gives an overview of system management mode
(SMM) and discusses how its features make it an ideal
execution environment for stealthy malware.
The intel architecture deﬁnes four processor modes of
operation: real mode, virtual-8086 mode, protected mode,
and system management mode [6]. Real mode and virtual8086 mode are legacy modes dating back to the 80286 /
80386 CPU. Real mode is characterized by a segmented 20
bit addressable memory space and the lack of hardware
memory protection. MS-DOS and early windows OS
versions ran in real mode. Current operating systems run
in either 32 or 64 bit protected mode. Protected mode
overcomes the limitations of real mode by extending the
addressable memory space to 32/64 bits and adding support
for paging, memory protection, and multi-tasking. Virtual
8086 mode was designed to allow real mode and protected
mode programs to co-exist; however, it is seldom used by
modern operating systems. In contrast to the other modes,
system management mode (SMM) was not designed for
running operating systems or user programs. Rather, it
was intended for managing low-level hardware operations
(e.g., power management and thermal regulation) and is
usually installed by the BIOS. SMM has its own memory
space and execution environment which is invisible to
code running outside of SMM. Furthermore, SMM code is
completely non-preemptible, lacks any concept of privilege
level, and is immune to memory protection. These things
clearly make SMM a potentially attractive home for
stealthy rootkits. System management mode is entered
when the processor receives a system management interrupt
(SMI) [6].

3.1. SMRAM---the SMM memory space
The system management memory space (SMRAM) is
used to hold the processor state information saved upon
an entry to SMM, the SMI handler, and its associated
data [6]. The intel chipset documentation deﬁnes three
locations for SMRAM: compatible, high memory segment
(HSEG), and top of memory segment (TSEG) [16]. The
compatible region overlaps the legacy VGA memory range
from 0xA0000 to 0xBFFFF and is the default location
for SMRAM. Normally, the contents of SMRAM are
only visible to code executing in system management
mode. This isolation is ensured by the chipset’s rerouting
of any non-SMM memory accesses to the VGA frame
buffer. Compatible SMRAM is also limited to 128K. The

0xBFFFF

0x00000000

SMBASE+0x8000
0xA0000
(SMBASE)

Figure 1. The physical memory map for the intel 845 chipset
showing location of the compatible SMRAM region and its layout
on a 32-bit system.

HSEG and TSEG regions provide an extended, write-back,
cacheable SMM memory space up to 256 MB in size.
Structurally, the SMRAM space consists of a state save
area and the system management interrupt (SMI) handler.
The remaining space is available for use by the handler
for data and stack storage. An internal processor register,
called SMBASE, holds the physical address pointer to the
start of the SMRAM space. The SMBASE value is also
stored in the state save area. Furthermore, the state save
area is located at an offset from the beginning of SMRAM
in physical memory. This area is used to store the register
context when a system management interrupt (SMI) occurs.
The SMI handler is also located at an offset from the start
of SMRAM. Figure 1 illustrates the location and layout of
compatible SMRAM.

3.2. Entering & exiting SMM
The processor enters system management mode when it
receives a system management mode interrupt (SMI) [6].
When an SMI is received, execution context is saved
into the SMRAM state save map and execution of the
SMI handler is commenced. The saved state information
includes the processor’s control registers, segment registers,
task register, general purpose registers, ﬂags, instruction,
and stack pointers. The SMM execution environment is
similar to 16 bit real mode, with the difference that the
full 32 bit ﬂat physical address space is accessible. Code
executing in SMM is non-pre-emptible because SMIs have
greater priority than both processor exceptions and external
interrupts, including non-maskable interrupts (NMI). When
the SMI handler wishes to exit system management mode, it
executes the resume from system management mode (RSM)
instruction [7]. The RSM instruction restores the previous
execution context by copying the saved state information in
SMRAM back into the processor’s registers and then returns
control back to the interrupted code. The I/O controller
chipset documentation deﬁnes a variety of events capable
of triggering an SMI. A few of them include: a power button
press, real time clock (RTC) alarm, USB wake events,
advanced conﬁguration and power interface (ACPI) timer
overﬂows, periodic timer expiration, and a write to the
advanced power management control (APM) register, 0xB2
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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[17]. In the next section, we detail how some of these events
might be exploited by a stealthy rootkit.

4. SMBR DESIGN &
IMPLEMENTATION
A successful SMBR must overcome two obstacles. First,
it must write its code into the SMM handler portion of the
SMRAM memory space. This process should be capable of
occurring from within a protected mode environment (e.g.,
Windows or Linux operating system) in order to give the
rootkit its maximum infection potential. Second, the rootkit
must have some means of intercepting events in the host
system and gaining control of execution.
In this section, we discuss the design and implementation
of an SMBR. We take a similar approach to Reference
[5] with our design and development; however, we opt to
design a practical rootkit that can be implemented on native
hardware, as opposed to a simulated virtualization platform
like Vmware. Section 4.1 describes how the SMBR can
be installed on a running operating system. We discuss
our implementation of a SMM handler that functions
as a chipset-level keylogger and network backdoor in
Section 4.2. Finally, we discuss the potential for other,
related forms of malicious hardware subversion at the
chipset level.

4.1. Rootkit installation
The rootkit can install a new SMM handler when it has I/O
port access privileges, the ability to map physical memory,
and when the SMRAM region has not been locked by
the BIOS or other system software. We used a Windows
kernel driver to install the SMBR. The intel chipset
documentation deﬁnes a system management RAM control
register (SMRAMC) which controls the accessibility and
visibility of SMM space from other processor modes [17].
The two relevant bits in this register are the D LCK bit
and the D OPEN bit. D OPEN controls the visibility of
SMRAM. If D OPEN is clear, SMRAM is only visible to
code executing in SMM mode. Non-SMM mode memory
reads / writes are diverted by the chipset to the VGA frame
buffer. Figure 2 illustrates this process. D LCK controls
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the accessibility of SMRAM by controlling access to the
SMRAMC register. If D LCK is set, the SMRAMC register
becomes read-only and remains that way until a reset occurs.
Assuming that the D LCK bit is clear, the rootkit is installed
as follows:
(1) On a host machine, an attacker makes SMRAM
visible from protected mode for reading and writing
by setting the D OPEN bit.
(2) Once D OPEN is set, the attacker copies the
rootkit SMM handler code to the handler portion of
SMRAM as deﬁned by the Intel documentation [6].
(3) Finally, the attacker clears the D OPEN bit and
sets the D LCK bit. This has the effect of making
SMRAM invisible to everything other than the
subverted (rootkit) SMI handler and of locking the
SMRAMC register so that it can no longer be
modiﬁed. The addressing of the SMRAMC register
is chipset speciﬁc.

4.2. Rootkit SMM handler implementation
In the following section, we discuss the implementation
of our proof of concept rootkit SMM handler. Our
rootkit functions as a chipset-level keylogger and network
backdoor. We use intel chipsets as opposed to other chipsets
because intel provides extensive documentation for them,
and hence, it is easier for us to come up with the prototype.
Besides, intel chipsets are one of the most popular chipsets
used in personal computers. For other chipsets that do
not have detailed documentation, advanced attackers can
conduct reverse engineering in order to ﬁgure out how to
program those chipsets.
First, we give an overview of the intel APIC architecture.
This is followed by a description of the APIC redirection
technique that we use to trap key presses and the procedure
used to exﬁltrate the key data over the chipset LAN
interface. The intel advanced programmable interrupt
controller (APIC) is used to manage communication
between the CPU, chipset, and external peripheral devices.
It consists of two components: The I/O APIC and the
local APIC (LAPIC) [18]. The I/O APIC is located on the
motherboard while the local APIC is integrated into the
CPU. There is typically one I/O APIC for each peripheral

Figure 2. SMRAM memory accesses are ﬁltered by the chipset based on their origin and the state of D OPEN in the SMRAMC
register. SMM accesses are normally directed to SMRAM while non-SMM accesses are directed to VGA memory.
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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bus and one local APIC per CPU. The primary job of the I/O
APIC is to route the interrupts it receives from peripheral
buses to one or more local APICs on the system. In turn,
each local APIC is responsible for receiving and managing
the external interrupts for the CPU that it belongs to. When
it receives interrupts, the LAPIC dispatches them to the
processor, one at a time, based upon their priorities.
The processor looks up the handler for the interrupt in
the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) [7]. Each interrupt is
assigned a unique identiﬁer, called a vector. The processor
uses this value as an index into the IDT. The interrupt
descriptor table is a processor speciﬁc data structure
containing one entry for each of 255 deﬁned vectors.
Kernel rootkits often use IDT hooking to intercept processor
interrupts and exceptions [19]. This involves replacing
the operating system handler contained in the IDT with
a pointer to a malicious hook routine. Fortunately, such
blatant modiﬁcations of the IDT are easily detectable.
Detection simply involves enumerating each of the handler
pointers and validating that the address is within the range
of either the OS kernel or a legitimate system driver. If
the address falls outside one of these known ranges, it is
ﬂagged as suspicious and a security analyst can conduct
further investigations.
Differing from the kernel rootkit described above, a
rootkit operating in system management mode does not
need to make any detectable changes to the IDT in order to
intercept interrupts. Rather than intercepting an interrupt at
the processor handling level, the SMM rootkit can intercept
it directly at the chipset level by rerouting the interrupt in
the APIC. We demonstrate this technique in our rootkit by
implementing a chipset keylogger. There are three steps in
this process. First, we must be able to intercept the keyboard
interrupt. Second, we must be able to sniff the keystrokes
from the keyboard’s internal buffer. Finally, we should
forward the interrupt to the CPU for normal handling.
We accomplish the ﬁrst step by rerouting the keyboard
IRQ to system management mode. Thus, whenever a user
presses a key, our SMM handler is called. In the handler,
we are able to sniff the key. Finally, we manually forward
the interrupt to the CPU for normal handling by taking
advantage of the local APIC’s inter processor interrupt (IPI)
mechanism. We outline the implementation details in the
following section.
As mentioned previously, the I/O APIC’s primary
function is to receive and route peripheral hardware
interrupts to the local APIC for delivery to the CPU. For
this purpose, the I/O APIC architecture deﬁnes a redirection
table [17]. The redirection table contains a dedicated entry
for each interrupt pin. It is used to translate the physical,
hardware signal into an APIC message on the APIC bus.
This table can be used to specify the destination of the
interrupt, the vector, and the delivery mode.
The delivery mode is the primary ﬁeld of interest for our
rootkit. Most interrupts use the ﬁxed delivery mode. This
mode automatically forwards the interrupt to the LAPICs
for all processors speciﬁed in the destination. Our rootkit
changes the delivery mode of the keyboard IRQ from ﬁxed
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to SMI. Now, rather than automatically forwarding the
interrupt, it will be redirected to our SMM handler. In our
handler, we are free to sniff the contents of the keyboard
buffer and send it out in network packets.
We can accomplish the second step of extracting the
keyboard data by reading the keyboard’s internal hardware
registers. The key press information is extracted by reading
from the keyboard data register. Unfortunately, this read
is destructive. Therefore, after the key data has been read,
it must be replaced so that it is accessible to other system
software. We replace it by writing a speciﬁc command byte
to the keyboard command register. This byte instructs the
keyboard that the next byte written to the data register
should remain there as if placed there by a physical key
press [20].
Once we have extracted the keyboard data, it is necessary
to forward the interrupt to the CPU for normal user input
handling. Otherwise, the keyboard will no longer function.
We use the local APIC’s ability to issue inter processor
interrupts (IPI) for this purpose. The LAPIC documentation
deﬁnes an interrupt command register (ICR) [7]. Using this
register it is possible to send an interrupt to one or more
processors, including self. As in the I/O APIC’s redirection
table, the destination, vector, and delivery mode are all
speciﬁable. When the lower 4 bytes of the ICR are written to,
the LAPIC generates the IPI message and sends it out over
the system bus. From within our SMM handler, we re-issue
the interrupt with a destination of self and a ﬁxed delivery
mode by writing to the ICR. Therefore, the keyboard
interrupt is delivered to the processor in the normal manner
as soon as we exit from SMM mode. Figure 3 illustrates
how the SMBR intercepts a keystroke signal and forwards
it to the CPU.

4.3. Data exfiltration
After we have captured the keyboard data, we use the
chipset LAN controller to transmit the key data collected
by our SMM keylogger to an external IP address. Thus,
our SMM handler has two functions: it logs keystrokes
and then sends the logged data out over the chipset LAN
interface. The transmit action is performed periodically in
the SMM handler when a deﬁned keyboard data storage
buffer becomes full. Using a buffer as opposed to sending
the keystrokes immediately as they are received allows more
variability in when to send the data and could be exploited
by a rootkit wishing to use trafﬁc shaping techniques to
stealthily blend in with existing network activity. This
simulates the behavior of a malicious attacker attempting
to exﬁltrate sensitive material from a compromised
system.
The LAN controller acts as both a master and a slave on
the PCI bus. In the role of master, it interacts with system
memory to access transmit and receive data buffers. As
a slave, the host processor accesses the LAN controller’s
internal structures to read and write information to its onchip registers. These registers may be either I/O mapped
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 3. Normal and SMBR keystroke handling paths.

or memory mapped. The method to use is determined by
system software.
The data exﬁltration component was designed for the
Intel 8255x chipset. Therefore, in the following section, we
give a brief overview of the Intel 8255 frame transmission
architecture.
The two primary hardware components of the intel 8255x
chipset are the command unit (CU) and the receive unit
(RU). For this paper, we will focus on the command
unit since it controls the function of frame transmission.
Software issues commands to the CU by writing to the
command word ﬁeld of a memory mapped data structure
called the system control block (SCB). Various commands
cause the device to transmit, suspend, resume, or idle. The
layout of this structure is illustrated in Figure 4.
The CU’s frame transmission function operates upon
another data structure called the Command Block List
(CBL). The CBL is a linked list data structure in shared
system memory consisting of command blocks containing
command parameters and status information. These blocks
include diagnostic and conﬁguration commands in addition
to the transmit command. Figure 5 shows the layout of the
command block list.
In order to transmit a packet, we need to construct the data
packet and initialize a transmit command block (TCB). The
TCB is a special type of command block used for transmit

Figure 4. 8255x system control block (SCB).
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Figure 5. 8255x command block list.

commands. The steps for building and sending a data packet
are outlined below:
(1) First, we construct the data packet. Because we
don’t have access to the upper level NDIS or TDI
drivers, this process must be performed manually.
For simplicity, we chose to use the UDP protocol
in our proof of concept implementation. Thus, the
basic packet structure consists of an Ethernet header
followed by an IP header, followed by a UDP header
followed by the payload.
(2) Second, we build a Transmit Command Block. The
exact format of this data structure is contained in
the Intel 82558 chipset documentation. Typically, the
Transmit Command Block is followed in memory by
the transmit data buffer.
(3) After the data packet and Transmit Command Block
are deﬁned, we check the LAN controller to ensure
that it’s in an idle state and load its System Control
Block’s General Pointer ﬁeld with the physical
address of the Transmit Command Block.
(4) Finally we initiate execution of the LAN controller
by sending it a CU Start command. This causes it to
begin executing the Transmit Command Block that
will send the data packet out over the network.

SMM rootkit

Figure 6. 8255x receive frame area.

4.4. Optional data infiltration
Since SMM rootkits are usually used for high-proﬁle
targeted attacks, attackers in most situations would like to
keep their SMM rootkits running as long as possible to
obtain more and long-time sensitive data from compromised
targets. As their objectives change along the time, most
attackers would like to be able to control what operations
their remote rootkits should conduct. For this purpose,
SMM rootkits could build with a data inﬁltration capability
so that they could receive further commands from their
owners.
Packet reception on the 8255x is based upon the concept
of a receive frame area (RFA). The layout of RFA is shown
in Figure 6. The RFA is a region of physical memory that
is shared between the NIC and the CPU. It is subdivided
into blocks called receive frame descriptors (RFDs). The
receive frame descriptor is a data structure consisting of two
parts: a header followed by a data buffer capable of holding
the maximum ethernet packet size. Every frame received
by the NIC controller is described by one RFD. The RFD
layout is shown in Figure 7. The NIC’s RFA can be located
by reading the “general pointer” ﬁeld from the NIC’s status
control block. The last RFD in the list is indicated by setting
the EL bit.
Frame reception occurs when the device detects a frame
on the link with an address that matches either the individual
address, a multicast address, or broadcast address. It
transfers the frame to the receive FIFO which in turn causes
the NIC’s receive DMA unit to transfer the frame to main
memory on the host machine. Successful frame reception, in
turn, causes the NIC to raise a frame receive (FR) interrupt
on the host machine. The FR interrupt handler is responsible
for extracting the RFD data, setting the appropriate status
bits in the RFD header, and ensuring that it is passed to
kernel and user components higher in the networking stack.

Figure 7. 8255x receive frame descriptor.
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On Windows, during normal operating, the RFA is cooperatively managed between the Windows NDIS driver
and the intel bus driver (e100b325.sys). A malicious
driver can circumvent the normal operation of packet
arrival by inserting itself between the physical hardware
interface and the operating system. This is in contrast
to previous stealthy network backdoors like Joanna’s
DeepDoor rootkit [21] which inserted themselves in NDIS,
deep in the OS networking stack, yet still above the
physical hardware interface. Our backdoor operates one
level lower. By intercepting the NIC’s FR interrupt that
indicates packet arrival, we can inspect arriving frames
prior to the OS or any ﬁrewall software running on the host
machine.
When the LAN controller receives an interrupt, the APIC
dispatches it to the CPU where it is looked up in the Interrupt
Descriptor Table. Normally, the interrupt handler for the
network card is managed by the Windows NDIS driver.
The upper half of Figure 8 illustrates this process. We can
intercept it by replacing the pointer with our own. Thus,
when a packet arrives, we will receive the ﬁrst notiﬁcation
and will be able to inspect the receive buffer prior to any
operating system software.
This direct hooking technique, however, can be detected
by security software by checking if the NIC interrupt in
the IDT points to the OS where it should. To improve
the stealthiness of our network backdoor, we can redirect
the NIC’s interrupt to another interrupt that is not being
currently used by the OS. As mentioned previously, the I/O
APIC’s primary function is to receive and route peripheral
hardware interrupts to the Local APIC for delivery to the
CPU. For this purpose, the I/O APIC architecture deﬁnes a
redirection table. The redirection table contains a dedicated
entry for each interrupt pin. It is used to translate the
physical, hardware signal into an APIC message on the
bus. This table can be used to specify the destination of
the interrupt, the vector, and the delivery mode. We can
therefore, change interrupt vector for the NIC and redirect
it to a different, unused entry in the IDT. From this handler,
after we inspect the incoming frame we can pass it on to
the OS handler. The bottom half of Figure 8 illustrates this
redirection technique.
The implementation of the process for monitoring
incoming trafﬁc can be described as follows:

Figure 8. Interception of packet receive using IOAPIC interrupt
redirection.
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(1) Identify the interrupt for 8255x compatible network
card.
(2) Look up the OS handler for that interrupt in the CPU
interrupt descriptor table (IDT) and save the pointer.
(3) Locate an unused interrupt in the IDT and hook it by
replacing the handler address with the address of our
backdoor’s handler.
(4) Redirect the NIC interrupt to our new, hooked IDT
vector by modifying the chipset’s APIC Redirection
Table.
When an interrupt from the NIC is received, the following
steps occur:
(1) Determine if the interrupt is due to a frame arrival
(check bit in Status Control Block). If it’s for some
other reason, call the OS handler.
(2) If the interrupt is due to frame arrival, locate the start
of the receive frame area (RFA) from the SCB general
pointer ﬁeld.
(3) Scan the data portion of the receive frame descriptors
in the RFA. This scan is used to identify a “special”
ICMP packet.
(4) If a “special” packet belonging to the backdoor is
identiﬁed, then erase it.
(5) Else, pass control to the OS handler and let it process
the packet normally.
As illustrated in Figure 8, our method of redirecting
the interrupt at the I/O APIC redirection table increases
the SMM rootkit’s stealthiness because we are not directly
hooking the OS interrupt handler for the network. Instead,
we take an unused interrupt and reprogram the chipset to
interrupt on the new vector. This technique makes the rootkit
undetectable by current rootkit detection software that
relies on IDT table scanning for possible rootkit hooking.
However, data exﬁltration function will more or less
increase the SMM rootkit exposure chance since it changes
the low-level APIC redirection table---it can be detected
once rootkit detection software checks chipset level data
structures for suspicious modiﬁcations. Therefore, we
believe data exﬁltration is an optional design for SMM
rootkit; attackers may implement it when they feel it is
necessary compared to the exposure risk.

4.5. Real world SMM rootkits
Although we have only implemented a proof of concept
keylogger and network backdoor, a real-world SMM
rootkit could implement an unlimited number of malicious
services. Virtually every peripheral hardware device can be
subverted using these techniques. Some of these devices
include the USB ports, Mouse, and Hard Disks. We
can envision an extended version of our rootkit that not
only transmits exﬁltrated data, but also receives malicious
commands from an attacker and relays all manner of
sensitive materials stealthily out over the network. An SMM
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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rootkit can also gain control on non-hardware events like
periodic timer expiration. This would allow for SMIs to be
generated at regular intervals, a potentially useful feature
for a malicious rootkit wishing to periodically gain control
to inspect the state of the system.
Furthermore, such malicious activities are difﬁcult to
detect. The SMM handler code is completely inaccessible
to the host system and there are no changes to processor
or operating system data structures. Indeed, the only
potentially detectable changes are the modiﬁcation to the
I/O APIC redirection table and network activity. As there are
legitimate reasons to change the delivery mode to SMI, the
modiﬁcation of I/O APIC redirection table is not a sufﬁcient
heuristic to identify a stealthy rootkit. One such legitimate
use is to provide legacy keyboard and mouse support for
USB devices [22]. Finally, the network transmission, which
occurs inside of SMM at the chipset level will bypass any
host-based intrusion detection systems or ﬁrewalls. The
network activity could be further concealed by using trafﬁc
shaping techniques.
4.6. Limitations
Our proof of concept rootkit has several limitations. It
currently works with PS/2 keyboards and a subset of
network cards, and it is limited to single processor systems.
However, all of these limitations could be addressed. First,
it is possible to extend our PS/2 implementation to intercept
events from USB keyboards. The chipset I/O controller
hub documentation deﬁnes a legacy keyboard handling
mechanism for USB keyboards which may be exploitable.
This legacy operation is performed through SMM space and
provides an area for future research.
“When a USB keyboard is plugged into the system, and
a standard keyboard is not, the system may not boot, and
DOS legacy software will not run, because the keyboard
will not be identiﬁed. The ICH4 implements a series of
trapping operations which will snoop accesses that go to
the keyboard controller, and put the expected data from the
USB keyboard into the keyboard controller. This legacy
operation is performed through SMM space [17].”
Second, network card support could be extended
provided that chipset documentation is available. Intel
provides developer documentation for most of their LAN
cards. Finally, our rootkit could probably be extended to
work on the newer multi-processor and multi-core systems.
We don’t have a multi-core test machine with SMM
unlocked, however, the documentation indicates that any
processor in a multiprocessor system can respond to an SMI
event and that two processors can be executing in SMM at
the same time. Furthermore, the manual states that SMM is
not re-entrant and that each processor should have its own
dedicated SMRAM space. Based upon this documentation,
it should be possible to extend our rootkit to handle SMI’s
on more than processor; however, it will require additional
research and development.
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In general, the architectural limitations that will apply
to an SMM-based rootkit include whether or not the
SMRAMC register is locked, the chipset speciﬁc nature of
an SMBR, and the size limitation of the SMM memory
space. Clearly, the biggest limitation is the fact that an
SMBR can be installed only if the SMRAMC register is
unlocked. The hardware speciﬁc nature of the SMBR is
probably the second biggest limitation. Because many of
the register offsets vary based on chipset, an attacker would
need to both know the hardware of the target machine or
hardcode a table of register offsets for every chipset and do
detection on the ﬂy. There may also be other subtle discrepancies in the chipset and/ or hardware implementation that
would require additional code to detect and handle. This
coupled with the fact that SMRAM is limited in size may
render a generic approach impractical. Finally, an SMBR
is non-persistent [23]. It exists only in volatile memory and
must be re-installed after a system reboot.

5. TESTING
We conducted four different tests. The ﬁrst one was a
vulnerability assessment. We wanted to get an idea of how
wide-spread the SMBR threat might be and the types of
systems that were most likely to be affected. Our other
experiments involved testing our proof of concept SMM
rootkit on a live system. We sought to validate its invisibility
to other system software and its functionality as a keylogger
network backdoor capable of exﬁltrating sensitive data.
5.1. Vulnerability assessment
The goal of our ﬁrst experiment was to perform a system
vulnerability assessment. We wrote a Windows device
driver to query the SMRAMC register for the values
of the D OPEN, D CLOSED, and D LCK bits. We ran
this program on 14 different systems and recorded the
manufacturer, chipset, BIOS version, BIOS date, and
whether or not the system was locked. Figure 9 shows
debug output from the test driver we wrote. Out of these

14 systems, we found six were unlocked and vulnerable
to the SMBR threat. Because a majority of the unlocked
systems had BIOS revision dates 4 years old or greater and
most of the locked systems had more recent BIOS revision
dates, we concluded that newer BIOS were locking system
management mode. Nevertheless, a substantial percentage
of commodity hardware in use today is at least 4 years
old. This still makes SMBRs a signiﬁcant threat. Figure 10
summarizes our preliminary results. We will conduct more
comprehensive vulnerability assessment in the near future,
especially testing a variety of older intel-based machines.

5.2. Live testing---hiding in memory
Our next experiment involved testing our proof of concept
SMBR. We installed it on an unlocked DELL dimension
2400 running an intel 845 chipset. The system was installed
with the Microsoft Windows XP operating system. We ﬁrst
sought to verify the invisibility of the installed rootkit. This
was accomplished by using the WinDbg kernel debugger
to view the physical memory region where we loaded the
rootkit code [24]. As expected, we were unable to read the
code from this area because one of the functions of the
rootkit installer is to close and lock system management
mode by writing to the SMRAMC register. As shown in
Figure 2, this will cause the access to be routed to VGA
memory. This result is unsurprising when one considers
that the chipset’s memory controller hub (MCH) functions
as a gatekeeper for all physical memory accesses. All
memory accesses, regardless of whether they originate
from software or hardware must pass through the MCH
logic. The MCH logic snoops physical addresses on the
bus and blocks unauthorized access to certain ranges like
the SMM memory space.

5.3. Live testing---key logging
Next, we validated the operation of the keylogger. Our proof
of concept code is currently limited to keyboards with a P/S
2 interface. Because it is impossible to read SMRAM once

Figure 9. Our test driver opening SMRAM space and displaying the original SMM handler.
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

S. Embleton, S. Sparks and C. C. Zou

SMM rootkit

Figure 10. System vulnerability assessment.

the rootkit is installed and the size of the SMRAM space
is limited, we needed a way to save and verify the logged
keystrokes. We implemented two different output methods:
the serial port and system physical memory.
In the ﬁrst method, we output the logged keystrokes
over the serial port from inside the SMM handler. We use
the Windows hyperterminal program to capture the serial
output and verify it against our key presses. This method is
primarily useful for debugging the SMM rootkit code.
In the second method, the SMM handler writes the
keyboard data to an allocated page of physical memory.
Since this page is outside the SMRAM space, we were able
to attach the WinDbg kernel debugger and read the recorded
keyboard scan codes from the page. An attacker could use
system memory in this manner as a temporary storage for
the key log ﬁle. To make it even stealthier, the attacker
could encrypt the data in SMM mode before writing it out to
system memory. Because SMRAM is not accessible outside
SMM, it would be impossible to obtain a copy of the key
to decrypt the stored data, even if one knew where to look.
To an outsider the encrypted keyboard data would simply
appear as random bytes and would be unlikely to raise
suspicion.
It should also be mentioned that our SMBR implementation doesn’t adversely affect the performance of the target
system. That is, from a subjective, user’s perspective, our
SMBR key logger does not introduce any noticeable slow
down or latency in keyboard input at the GUI level. We
validated this at different typing rates, but did not quantify
the SMBR’s performance using objective measures. This is
an area of future research.

5.4. Live testing---data exfiltration
We validated that our network backdoor was able to both
log keystrokes and transmit packets containing the logged
data successfully from inside the SMM rootkit handler.
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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We used an intel Pro 100B network card for development
and tested it using two machines connected to an Ethernet
network via a DLINK router. The ﬁrst machine was the
aforementioned Dell dimension 2400. We installed the
SMBR on it. The second machine was a Dell Precision
390 running Windows XP. We installed Microsoft Network
Monitor 3.1 on it so that we could sniff incoming network
trafﬁc. We were able to validate that the key press data was
successfully received by the second machine by examining
the sniffer output. The SMM network code, however, is card
speciﬁc and would require modiﬁcation to run on other
network cards. Figure 11 provides a screenshot showing
that the SMM keyboard data was packaged into a TFTP
packet and sent out to the remote machine using UDP
over IP. The data payload following the TFTP header is
highlighted.
To illustrate the stealth of the SMBR, we tested our
rootkit’s data exﬁltration capability against the Zone alarm
intrusion detection system. Zone alarm provides both
inbound and outbound intrusion detection. It also has
a LOCK feature which allows the user to lock his/her
computer so that applications can neither send nor receive
data over the network. We chose to test under the strictest
possible conditions with the LOCK feature enabled.
Our test consisted of sending out logged keyboard data
in specially crafted UDP packet. As expected, Zone alarm
did not detect any access attempt. Indeed, detecting this
type of rootkit behavior is very difﬁcult from within a
compromised system. This is due to the fact that the rootkit
exists in an isolated environment, does not require any
changes to the OS or other architectural data structures,
and communicates directly with the hardware. If one were
able to detect and validate reads and writes on the shared
memory region of the card, it might be possible to monitor
outgoing trafﬁc. Unfortunately, both SMM and the card
hardware address memory physically rather than virtually
and the x86 does not support monitoring physical memory
accesses.
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Figure 11. Capturing the key logger packet (TFTP header is [00,03,00,00] for a data packet).

This test serves to highlight the seriousness of a
weaponized SMBR that has a built-in data exﬁltration
capability. Unrestricted, difﬁcult to detect outbound data
exﬁltration will impose a serious and long-term information
exposure to some high-proﬁle compromised targets, such
as ﬁnancial institutes, government agencies and military
sections.

receive the incoming crafted ICMP packets. In addition,
we tested the data inﬁltration by running security software
zone alarms and snort; none of them can detect the incoming
Internet access activities.

5.5. Live testing---data infiltration

As mentioned previously, one of the SBMR’s biggest
limitations is the fact that it can be installed only if the
SMRAMC register is unlocked. Based upon our research
(as shown in Figure 10), SMM rootkits are more likely to
exist on older processors containing older BIOS versions
(more than 2 years old). This is due to the fact that many
newer BIOS have set the D LCK bit in the SMRAM
control register rendering SMRAM inaccessible outside the
BIOS.
Despite this limitation, an attacker may still be able
to install an SMBR with an additional step. An attacker
may be able to modify and reﬂash the BIOS such that the
BIOS leaves SMM unlocked. Disassembling the BIOS to
identify the code that needs to be modiﬁed is, however, a
tedious and difﬁcult task. Furthermore, the mechanism for
reﬂashing the system BIOS is typically vendor speciﬁc and
poses a danger to the system if there is any possibility of
error or power failure.
Alternatively, the attacker can install the rootkit before
the BIOS locks SMRAM, then he/she will have control of
the system. It may be possible to do this by exploiting an
expansion ROM. In Reference [25] Heasman describes an
approach a malware author may use to exploit an expansion
ROM. When a system boots, the system BIOS is copied
from ﬂash memory to RAM and begins executing. One of
the ﬁrst tasks performed by the BIOS is a scan of the PCI
bus to detect installed devices. During this scan, the BIOS

Finally, we used specially crafted ICMP packets containing
the data payload “r00t was here before this!” to conduct
data inﬁltration test. This string serves as a form of
“signature” in the packet receive interrupt handler to
indicate that the packet is destined for the backdoor rather
than the operating system. In order to test data inﬁltration,
we used a secondary laptop running the network packet
generator (NPG) program to craft these special packets.
NPG is a free GNU GPL Windows packet injector. It
uses WinPcap to send packet out the network interface.
The packets are deﬁned in a packet ﬁle and it is possible
to craft any kind of packet, regardless of headers or
payload.
The approach we tested was packet erasing. In this
method, the rootkit zeroes out the data portion of the receive
frame descriptor including the MAC, IP, TCP, and ICMP
headers. In this case, the OS drops the packet without
sending it up the network stack, and hence, incoming
packets cannot be observed by any OS-based security
software. When we compared the backdoor’s Debug output
with Microsoft network monitor, we saw that Microsoft
network monitor failed to report any kind of network
activity, ICMP or otherwise. Even when we set the Windows
XP ﬁrewall to block all outside sources from connecting to
the computer, the network backdoor could still successfully

5.6. Exploiting PCI expansion ROMs to
install SMBRs on “locked” systems
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Figure 12. Illustration of the execution of BIOS during system boot. (1) The BIOS begins executing. (2) The BIOS enumerates the
PCI bus, copies any expansion ROMs to main memory, and hands off control to them. Note: SMM has not been locked yet so it is
possible for a malicious ROM to install a malicious SMM handler at this point. (3) After executing the expansion ROMs, the BIOS
regains control, and completes system initialization. The BIOS locks SMM at some point after the expansion ROMs have run, but
before it turns control over to the Operating System’s boot loader.

will identify whether or not any installed devices contain
expansion ROMs. Expansion ROMs hold device speciﬁc
initialization code that needs to run during execution of the
system BIOS. If it ﬁnds any, it copies them to memory, and
then executes them by calling into the ROM at offset 0x03.
This process is illustrated in Figure 12.
We were curious whether or not BIOS writers initialized
and locked SMM before or after calling the expansion
ROM’s. If the BIOS locked SMM after calling them, it
might be possible to re-ﬂash a PCI card to install a malicious
SMM handler and lock it into place before the BIOS locked
SMRAM. To test this theory, we re-ﬂashed the BIOS on an
old promise fast track TX2 raid controller card with code
to query the value of the SMRAMC register at the time
the boot ROM was executed. Although we only tested it
on three systems, we discovered that at the time our code
ran, the BIOS had not yet locked SMM. If this is indicative
of a general trend, a malicious boot ROM might provide a
viable option for installing SMBRs on locked systems. The
drawbacks, however, would be the need for the target system
to have a ﬂashable boot ROM and the need for the attacker
to have prior knowledge of the hardware conﬁguration of
the target system. Malware authors may partially avoid
these limitations by targeting popular, widely deployed PCI
hardware devices that are ﬂashable.

6. EVALUATION & DISCUSSION
SMM and VMM-based rootkits both operate at a level
outside an existing operating system. Therefore it makes
sense to compare and contrast them. We compare and
contrast the SMM and VMM rootkits based on four
characteristics: operating environment, complexity and
size, control, and stealth. Figure 13 summarizes the
comparisons between SMBRs and VMBRs.
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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6.1. Operating environment
SMBR and VMBR rootkits each have their own optimal
target environment. Both types of rootkits are hardware
speciﬁc. Virtualization rootkits can only exist on processors
supporting virtualization extensions. This limits them to
newer processors mostly less than 2--3 years old. In contrast,
SMM rootkits are more likely to exist on older processors
containing older BIOS versions (greater than 4 years old
as shown in Figure 13). This is due to the fact that many
newer BIOS have set the D LCK bit in the SMRAM control
register rendering SMRAM inaccessible outside the BIOS.
Additionally, while virtualization rootkits are processorspeciﬁc, system management mode-based rootkits are
chipset speciﬁc. This makes them best suited for
a sophisticated, targeted attack rather than a vector
for widespread malware distribution. The operating
environments are also very different because VMBRs
operate in protected mode with paging enabled while
SMBRs operate in a 16 bit environment similar to real mode
without paging. Finally, both VMBR’s and SMBR’s can be
classiﬁed as non-persistent rootkits. Non-persistent rootkits
exist only in memory and lack the ability to persist across
reboots on the machine they are installed on. Although on
the surface this seems like a signiﬁcant disadvantage, when
one considers that many server systems run for weeks or
months at a time between reboots, it becomes less of an
issue. Due to the complex nature of the SMBR, it is unlikely
that such a rootkit will appear on the more frequently
rebooted systems (e.g., home user machines) anytime soon.

6.2. Complexity & size
Compared with VMBRs, SMBRs have an advantage in
terms of size and complexity. While they have the added
developmental complexity of having to deal with writing
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Figure 13. Comparison of VMBRs and SMBRs.

the SMM handler in legacy 16 bit assembly, they expand
little effort to conceal their memory footprint as the chipset
handles the memory access redirection once SMRAM has
been closed and locked by the handler. On the other hand,
in order to provide similar stealth, a VMBR will likely have
a larger code footprint. This is due to its need to include
complex paging code for memory virtualization support.

of detection because they operate in an environment without
caching or paging enabled. Therefore, they should not have
any detectable effects upon either the cache or the TLB.
SMM rootkits may provide greater stealth with less
overhead. A VMM rootkit is not hidden in memory unless it
implements memory virtualization. In contrast, the SMBR
is hidden by default due to the MCH redirection of nonSMM originated memory accesses to the SMRAM region.

6.3. Control

7. DEFENSE
Both VMBR and SMBR rootkits are capable of efﬁciently
exerting control over the system and neither needs to
modify the target operating system in order to obtain that
control. With that said, VMM rootkits might have the upper
hand where ﬂexibility is concerned. They can intercept
a greater number of higher level events like interrupts,
memory access, debug, and control register reads/writes,
and execution of speciﬁc privileged instructions. Although
SMBRs have considerable control over peripheral hardware
as we demonstrated in our proof of concept keylogger, in
general, they tend to intercept lower level hardware events
like power management, thermal regulation, and bus errors
and will have limited control over processor speciﬁc events
like memory access and instruction execution.

6.4. Stealth
Compared with VMBRs, SMBRs are stealthier. Several
detections based upon cache and TLB discrepancies have
been proposed for detecting virtualization rootkits [26].
Because a VMBR operates in protected mode with paging
enabled, there is no easy way for it to prevent its execution
from affecting the TLB. SMBRs are immune to these types

In this section, we consider the detection and prevention of
both OS dependent and OS independent rootkits. We feel
that the emergence of OS independent rootkits necessitates
a shift in focus from detection to prevention.
7.1. OS dependant rootkits
To date, most rootkit defense has focused on rootkit
detection. This is possibly because detecting an OS
dependent rootkit may, in fact, be easier than preventing
its installation. Prevention is difﬁcult and there are several
reasons for this. These include difﬁculty controlling end
user behavior, multiple attack entry points, and the presence
of unpatched vulnerabilities.
It is difﬁcult to control the behavior of an end user.
End users are subject to social engineering attacks which
may lead to them inadvertently install or run a malicious
application. Assuming that the malicious application has
gotten past the user, security software may attempt to
prevent further damage by preventing or limiting access to
the kernel. Unfortunately, there are many entry points into
the kernel and it is difﬁcult to guard them all. Additionally,
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there are often undocumented entry points into a system.
These usually take the form of exploits for unpatched
vulnerabilities in the operating system or critical software.
While prevention is a difﬁcult problem, detection may be
slightly easier. OS dependent malware can be detected fairly
reliably using signature or heuristic based scans. Clearly,
malware that coexists with an OS must make changes within
the environment in order to exercise control over it and/or
hide itself. Heuristics have been developed to detect many
of these changes [4,27].

7.2. OS independent rootkits
OS independent rootkits present a new dilemma. Both
virtualization and SMM rootkits are considerably more
difﬁcult to defend against than OS dependent malware.
First, it is not necessary for them to make any visible
changes to the OS. Thus, heuristics are not useful. Second,
they have the capability to conceal their memory footprints
making signatures useless. As a result, indirect detection
measures like timing or cache discrepancies have been
suggested for virtualization rootkits [26].
Timing attacks may provide a method of detecting
an SMM rootkit. We have validated that the processor’s
timestamp counter is updated, even while executing in
SMM. Thus, it may be possible to devise a detection that
reads the timestamp counter before and after an SMI and
compares it with the normal time taken by a machine’s SMM
code. However, if an attacker knows the existence of this
form of detection on target machine, he can develop the
SMM rootkit to counter-attack this defense. This is because
the rootkit itself has access to the counter and is capable
of modifying it before returning control back to the host
operating system.
Another class of detection for OS independent malware
relies on cache or TLB discrepancies. For example, VMM
rootkits may be detected by their effects on the cache or TLB
because they must exist in cacheable, pageable memory.
Unfortunately, this kind of timing attack is not valid against
SMM rootkit. SMM rootkit does not inﬂuence the cache or
TLB because it can exist in uncached memory and does not
use paging.
It has also been suggested to move detection off
the CPU onto another hardware device that has access
to physical memory [28]. The problem with this
approach is that the chipset arbitrates all external
device communication/physical memory access through the
memory controller hub (MCH). Therefore, SMRAM will
remain inaccessible to any devices residing on the system
bus.
As mentioned previously, one could check the IOAPIC
redirection table for interrupts that have been routed to
SMIs. A rerouted interrupt may be considered a “red ﬂag”,
but even that may not be a sufﬁcient heuristic. There are,
in fact, legitimate reasons to route an interrupt to an SMI.
One such legitimate use is to provide legacy keyboard
and mouse support for USB devices [22]. Therefore,
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lacking other rootkit indicators, it may be difﬁcult to
determine the illegitimacy of a rerouted interrupt and
state with certainty that it was installed by a rootkit. It
may, however, be possible to detect VMBR and SMBR
malware during installation if a signature is known. This
is possible because an anti-malware kernel module can
scan third party drivers and processes as they are being
loaded. On the other hand, if a signature for the malware
is not known or the malware installs itself through an
undocumented interface (e.g., exploit), it is unlikely to be
detected.
We suggest that the emergence of OS independent
malware like SMM and virtualization rootkits necessitates
a shift in emphasis from detection to prevention. Virtualized
rootkits may be prevented by installing a secure virtual
machine monitor (VMM) that prevents the installation of
other virtual machines [29]. SMBRs can be prevented
by locking down the SMRAM register in the BIOS.
Therefore, chipset manufacturers should be encouraged to
release BIOS updates to address this problem and system
administrators of older machines should ensure that their
BIOS are up to date. In the interim, the operating system
could greatly mitigate this problem by locking the register
during early boot before third party drivers are loaded.
This would prevent such rootkits from being installed by
user mode applications or kernel drivers on a running
system. Failing both of the aforementioned suggestions, a
third party anti -virus or host based intrusion prevention
(HIPS) software application could write a driver to lock
the SMRAM control register that the OS installs during
early boot. Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to guarantee that the
protection driver will be loaded before another malicious
kernel driver.

8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have exposed a potential threat that
has not been widely recognized. We have established that
a SMM rootkit has chipset level control over peripheral
hardware including the network controller, USB ports,
mouse, keyboard, and disk. It has control of both the I/O and
local APIC, is able to easily conceal its memory footprint,
and read/write indiscriminately to the 32 bit physical
address space. Practical development of an SMM rootkit,
however, is constrained by the following limitations: the
need for SMRAM to be unlocked, the need to write the
handler in assembly, and the lack of operating system
support. As a result, it is likely that SMM rootkits will
remain limited to sophisticated, targeted attacks.
Finally, we note that the SMM rootkit can be viewed
as a new breed of OS independent malware related to
VMBR and BIOS rootkits and that a signiﬁcant number
of older systems (>2 years old) remain vulnerable to
this threat. Newer systems could also be vulnerable to
the SMM rootkit if it can modify and reﬂash the BIOS
such that the BIOS leaves SMM unlocked. Furthermore,
the SMBR provides a method of implementing an OS
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independent rootkit on processors that don’t support the
new virtualization extensions. Thus, it may contribute to an
effective multi-vector rootkit attack capable of targeting a
large subset of current systems on the market. We suggest
that the emergence of such malware necessitates a shift in
perspective from detection to prevention and that a closer
relationship between security researchers and hardware
developers should be fostered.
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